Rubio ready to seal the deal to reunify Libya: the story of yet another Trumpian bluff

By the end of the month—according to sources cited by Il Foglio, possibly as early as June 29—U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is expected to welcome representatives from eastern and western Libya to Washington to formalize the historic reunification of the country.

The White House could then market the agreement as Trump’s “ninth peace deal,” were it not for the fact that, like many of the previous ones, the arrangement between Tripoli and Benghazi appears largely hollow.

Meanwhile, Giovanni Caravelli, the head of Italy’s foreign intelligence service, landed in Tripoli yesterday. With some irony, observers could not help but wonder whether he had come to bring back to Italy Almasri, recently sentenced to seven years in prison for torturing detainees at Mitiga prison.

The ruling looks more like a maneuver by Tripoli to avoid the arrest of the head of the prison police on behalf of the International Criminal Court. According to the official version provided by the Libyan government, Caravelli acted as a messenger for Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, reaffirming “the Italian government’s willingness to continue coordination and cooperation with Libya on the various issues of common interest.”

Beyond migration, at the top of the agenda for the intelligence chief—who met Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba—was the American plan to reunify Libya. One detail is particularly noteworthy: among the photographs of the meeting with Caravelli promptly released by the Libyan government, Italy’s ambassador, Gianluca Alberini, is nowhere to be seen. This is not new, but it does confirm the ongoing rivalry between the Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Ministry over Libya.

At the same time, the Foreign Ministry claimed credit for securing the release of the two Italians from the flotilla detained in Benghazi, though it remains unclear whether Caravelli played any role in that matter during his visit to Tripoli.

In any case, Italy appears ready to endorse the plan devised by Massad Boulos. Trump’s in-law and adviser for the Middle East and Africa is eager to prove that he is more than just a businessman who spent years selling machinery and trucks in Nigeria. He is convinced that he has earned the credentials of a true “dealmaker,” as Trump described him at the beginning of his second term.

In Libya, Boulos has been one of the central figures in a whirlwind week of diplomacy involving Tripoli, Benghazi, and Cairo. The push began last Sunday when Prime Minister Dabaiba received Egypt’s intelligence chief, Hassan Rashad, in the Libyan capital. This was no ordinary visit: no senior Egyptian official had traveled to Tripoli since 2021. Since then, relations had remained strained, with Egypt generally favoring dialogue with Haftar.

Rashad then flew to Cairo, where Boulos attended a summit with Saddam Haftar, Benghazi’s deputy commander-in-chief, who has reportedly received Washington’s backing as Libya’s president-in-waiting. The following day, Turkey also entered the fray, with Ankara’s intelligence chief, Ibrahim Kalin, visiting Benghazi.

All these efforts revolve around Boulos’s plan, which would see Saddam Haftar become president while current Prime Minister Dabaiba would remain head of government. Yet a simple count of those genuinely supporting the American initiative reveals that it has more opponents than backers.

No major political representative supports this power-sharing arrangement between the two families, nor do the leading tribal chiefs of western and southern Libya. Even in Misurata, Dabaiba’s hometown, local clans oppose the proposal.

The Libyan prime minister has therefore sought American assistance. Multiple sources confirmed to Il Foglio that around ten days ago a U.S. delegation, working for a consulting firm hired by the State Department, arrived in Misurata to persuade tribal leaders to support the plan.

“There are two ways to do it,” a Libyan source said. “Either by promising political positions or by distributing bribes.”

The United States is therefore prepared to invest heavily in the Boulos plan despite widespread skepticism.

“To the point that even if Trump’s adviser were to move on to another position tomorrow, Washington would continue pursuing it,” explained a well-informed source.

Indeed, Boulos harbors ambitions that extend beyond resolving complex dossiers such as Libya, Sudan, or Western Sahara—all crises on which he has worked so far without producing any tangible results.

According to information obtained by Il Foglio, Boulos put himself forward to head the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia and, after that proposal was rejected, shifted his attention to the American diplomatic mission in the United Arab Emirates. Although both posts are currently vacant, the embassy in Abu Dhabi is considered a less sensitive assignment than Riyadh.

Boulos’s reputation—which in the United States has thus far depended largely on being the father of Tiffany Trump’s husband—could certainly benefit from a successful agreement in Libya. Yet, on closer inspection, any future appointment as U.S. ambassador may once again depend more on his family ties to President Trump than on his actual abilities as a “dealmaker.”